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Abstract
This paper considers the second-best problem where not all links of a congested
transportation network can be tolled. The paper builds on earlier work in which the second-
best tax rule for this problem was derived for general static networks, so that the solution
presented is valid for any graph of the network, and for any set of tolling points available on
that network. The solution is now applied in an illustrative simulation model, in which various
second-best problems can be studied that might arise with the implementation of different
archetype pricing schemes. Apart from the benchmark of first-best pricing, these include for
instance a toll-cordon, parking policies in the city centre, and pay-lanes and ‘free-lanes’ on
major roads feeding into the city. An exploratory analysis is given of a possible method for
selecting the optimal location of toll points in case not all links can be tolled.
*The author is affiliated to the Tinbergen Institute, Keizersgracht 482, 1017 EG  Amsterdam. The research of
Erik Verhoef has been made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.￿1.  Introduction
Second-best issues in transport regulation have received ample attention in the recent
literature. This is often motivated by the observation that the first-best policy for a congested
road network – tolls equal to marginal external costs on each individual link – is a rather
theoretical construct. Various considerations often lead transport regulators to consider
second-best solutions only, in which not every single link of a transport network can be tolled.
Such considerations may include the costs for additional tolling points, such as the equipment
required in case of electronic toll collection, as well as the possible desire to start with
demonstration projects before implementing road pricing on a system-wide scale. Examples of
the resulting second-best congestion pricing schemes include ‘pay-lanes’, such as used at
various sites in the US, and ‘toll cordons’ around city centres, which have for instance been in
operation in various Scandinavian cities (see Small and Gomez-Ibañez, 1998, for a recent
review of applications of and experiments with road pricing). With a sufficiently broad
definition of the concept of a transport network, however, also parking charges can be
regarded as an example of the same type of problem: public parking space could be considered
as a tolled link in a network, parallel to an untolled link representing free private parking. And,
when adding ‘virtual links’ to a network, which involve no actual travelling but only a possible
toll, even policies like area permits appear to belong to the same class of second-best
congestion pricing problems.
A classic example of this type of second-best problems concerns the two-route
problem, where an untolled alternative road is available parallel to a toll road. This problem has
for instance been studied by Lévy-Lambert (1968), Marchand (1968), and more recently Braid
(1996), Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996). De Palma and Lindsey (1999), and Verhoef
and Small (1999), considered the same network for investigating various related second-best
problems. Glazer and Niskanen (1992) study second-best optimal parking fees for a city centre
where through-traffic as well as road users with access to private parking places cannot be
charged. And, as a somewhat different type of second-best problem, Braid (1989) and Arnott,
De Palma and Lindsey (1990) consider ‘flat’ single valued tolls for a dynamic bottleneck. A
recurring result is that second-best tax-rules – set so as to maximize social welfare given the
persistence of the second-best distortion – are generally different from the simple Pigouvian
rule (Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1995).
Verhoef (2000) offered a general solution for the second-best problem where not all
links of a congested transportation network can be tolled. The solution is ‘general’ in the sense
that it is valid for any possible graph of the network, for any possible sub-set of links that can
be tolled, and with elastic origin-destination (OD) demands. Yan and Lam (1996), without
deriving or using the analytic solution to the problem, discussed algorithms to find the solution
to a similar problem in the context of inelastic demands, but allowing for stationary state
queues.
In this paper, the solution proposed by Verhoef (2000) is tested and explored further
using a medium-sized network. The network used is primarily designed to capture the mostThe Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 2
important types of network spill-overs that may be relevant in the design of second-best
congestion pricing schemes, while limiting the number of links so that the possible danger of
the complexity of the network clouding essential insights is minimized. However, at the same
time, to secure some immediate policy relevance, a network configuration is used that can
describe some archetype second-best policies in a reasonably accurate way. In particular,
attention will be paid to area licences, parking charges, pay-lanes and ‘free-lanes’ (being the
mirror image of pay-lanes, so that instead of only one lane on a highway being tolled, only one
lane remains untolled), toll-rings, and of course first-best pricing. The network could be
considered as an admittedly very abstract representation of the current morning peak situation
in and around a city like Amsterdam, a city for which various types of congestion pricing
schemes have recently been proposed, some of which still being under serious consideration.
Apart from illustrating the general methodology of determining optimal second-best
tolls for a given set of toll-points, the paper will also consider the important question of which
links to select in case only a limited number of toll points can be selected. A simple procedure
for selecting the optimal toll points is proposed, which works surprisingly well in the simple
network used. The paper will give ample attention to practical aspects, such as the efficiency
and speed of algorithms and indicators, that will be important when applying the second-best
tolls and link-selection procedures in larger transport network models.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the procedure for
determining second-best optimal tolls in a generalized network, as proposed by Verhoef
(2000). Section 3 presents the simulation model, and discusses the qualitative properties of
various second-best optima resulting from the archetype pricing schemes mentioned above.
Section 4 proceeds by considering the problem of selecting optimal toll points. Section 5
concludes and gives some directions for further research.
2.  A general characterization of the problem
1
The analysis in this section pertains to a general transportation network . with continuous
numbers of users. This network consists of a set of nodes and a set of directed links (arcs).
Any pair of distinct nodes can be an origin-destination (OD-)pair, and the demand for trips
between such an OD-pair is not restricted to be perfectly inelastic. Apart from having a
possibly different willingness to pay for making a trip, and possibly different nodes of origin
and destination, all (potential) users of the network are assumed to be identical. The following
notation will be used (where primes denote derivatives):
5 the set of nodes in the network
0 the set of OD-pairs, denoted i=1,…,I
Ni the continuous number of users (or OD-flow) for OD-pair i, with Nit0
Di(Ni) the inverse demand function for trips for OD-pair i, with Dicd0
1 the set of directed links in the network, denoted j=1,…,J
Nj the continuous number of users (or link-flow) on link j, with Njt0
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cj(Nj) the average cost function for the use of link j, with cjct0
7 the set of non-cyclical paths in the network, denoted p=1,…,P
Np the continuous number of users (or path-flow) for path p, with Npt0
7P the set of non-cyclical paths for OD-pair i, denoted pi=1,…,Pi
Gjp a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if link j belong to path p, and a value of 0
otherwise
Gj a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if a toll can be charged on link j, and a value of 0
otherwise
fj the level of the toll on link j if Gj=1
Gip a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if pH7P and
￿￿ GG j p j j jj ii
j
J
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1
 and a value of 0 otherwise
Most of these variables are self-explanatory; the last dummy Gip can be interpreted as a dummy
identifying (when equal to 1) the ‘relevant paths’ in a network: those paths for which the
equilibrium cost level is equal to the minimum possible equilibrium costs for OD-pair i (see
below for further explanation). It is assumed that that all relevant functions Di(Ni) and cj(Nj)
are continuous and smooth. The cost functions represent generalized user costs including
monetized time costs, and are upward sloping in case of congestion. In the analysis below,
congestion is assumed to be link-specific. In case of a dynamic generalization of the present
model, for instance based on Vickrey’s (1969) model of bottleneck congestion, account should
indeed be taken of the possibility that in case of an arrival rate of users at the tail of a link
exceeding its capacity, queuing will occur, and will directly affect the cost levels at upstream
links. For a static model, however, which by definition cannot give a meaningful representation
of cases where arrival rates exceed capacities anyway (Verhoef, 1999), the assumption that
congestion is link-specific may often be acceptable.
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An important equilibrium concept is Wardrop’s (1952) first principle, stating that for every
OD-pair i the costs for used paths must be the same and that there are no unused paths with
strictly lower costs. For the general case where the demand functions Di(Ni) are not necessarily
perfectly inelastic, this can be represented according to the following complementary slackness
equilibrium conditions (see, for instance, Smith, 1979):
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(the arguments in the cost and demand functions are dropped whenever this does not lead to
confusion). Compared with the case of inelastic demands, equation (2) therefore adds the
economic equilibrium principle that marginal benefits should be equal to marginal private costsThe Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 4
to the standard Wardrop (1952) condition. The fact that Wardrop’s principle allows a
formulation of network problems in terms of variational inequalities (Kinderlehrer and
Stampacchia, 1980) has been recognized by for instance Dafermos (1980) and Nagurney
(1993). Inspection of (2) reveals that the dummy variable Gip discussed earlier takes on the
value of 1 only if path p from the set 7P is among those that may be used in the equilibrium by
travellers between OD-pair i. Such paths with Gip=1 will be called ‘relevant paths’ in the sequel.
However, for some of the relevant paths, Np actually still may be equal to zero in the
equilibrium, as will become clear when the uniqueness of the various variables in an equilibrium
is considered below. First, however, a final identity can be given, equating the usage for a OD-
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Under rather general conditions, a transportation network as described above can be expected
to have a unique equilibrium in OD-flows (the vector Ni) and link-flows (the vector Nj) for a
given set of tolls fj, in particular if Dic(Ni)<0 and cjc(Nj)>0 for all relevant i and j over the
relevant ranges (see, for instance, De Palma and Nesterov, 1998). It will be assumed
throughout this paper that such a unique solution exists. However, this does not imply that the
solution will be necessarily unique also in path-flows (the vector Np), nor in (first-best or
second-best) optimal toll levels (the vector fj) (Dafermos, 1973). Path flows are for instance
not unique when users from different OD-pairs share a part of the network where they can
choose between two parallel links with equal travel costs. Evidently, interchanging two users –
one from each parallel link – will then leave the equilibrium in terms of link-flows and OD-
flows intact, but may alter the equilibrium in terms of path-flows. Next, tolls may not be unique
when, for instance, on an intersection of tolled links, no (‘active’) origin or destination node is
located. A constant can then be added to the tolls on the links feeding into the intersection, and
subtracted from the tolls originating from that intersection, without changing the equilibrium
(see also Verhoef, 2000).
We now turn to the problem of finding the second-best optimal congestion tolls in the
case that tolls can be charged only on a given subset of links. As a matter of fact, the first-best
problem where tolls can be charged on all links is, of course, a special case of this general
second-best problem. It is assumed that, given the second-best constraint, the regulator sets
tolls so as to maximize social welfare, defined as total benefits minus total costs. Benefits are
determined according to the Marshallian measure. The regulator therefore has to solve the
problem that can be represented by the following Lagrangian:
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(4)The Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 5
The first set of terms represent total benefits, summed over all OD-pairs; note that the total
OD-flow is determined according to (3). The second set of terms represent total costs,
summed over all links in the network; note that the total link-flow is determined according to
(1). The third set of terms represent the constraints caused by the equilibrium conditions that
for each relevant path, the marginal benefits will be equal to the average costs plus the fees
incurred on the links making up that path. Note that these constraints are consistent with (2),
and that Op denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint for path p. The
inclusion of the dummies Gip, or Giq when the index q is used to denote paths for notational
reasons, secures that in the determination of the necessary first-order conditions for a local
optimum only the relevant paths are considered (note that, also for notational reasons, the
index k, when used, denotes OD-pairs). The following first-order conditions can be derived
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Notwithstanding the fact that the second-best equilibrium may not be unique in path-flows as
pointed out above, equations (5) show that the first-order conditions with respect to path-
flows are used to solve the problem. Path-flows give the necessary connection between the
benefit side (in terms of OD-flows) and the cost side (in terms of link-flows) in the model. It
may in particular be noted that the value of the derivative in (5) is independent of the specific
distribution of users from a given OD-pair over the various possible paths, as long of course as
the equilibrium conditions shown in equation (2) hold, since the relevant terms only depend on
either OD-flows or link-flows, which will all remain the same for any of the possible equilibria
in terms of path-flows.
Verhoef (2000) considered the analytical solution for the system of equations (5)-(7),
which, as can be expected, turns out to involve tedious expressions. The Lagrangian multipliers
Op play an important role in the solution. These multipliers can be interpreted as the ‘shadow
price of non-optimal pricing’ in the second-best optimum – which in fact follows directly from
the specification of the Lagrangian (4). Under first-best pricing, these multipliers would each
be equal to zero. Under second-best pricing, the tolls that can be controlled are set in such a
way that the sum of the multipliers that can be directly affected is zero. For further details and
interpretation, see Verhoef (2000).The Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 6
For the application of (5)-(7) in larger networks, no such analytical expressions for the
multipliers Op and tolls fj have to be used. Instead, one can rely on the numerical solution of the
system of equations that follows from substitution of (7) into (5) for each relevant path:
1 with 0
11
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(where (9) is identical to (6)). For a given network equilibrium in terms of use levels N,
equations (8) and (9) define a system in a number of linear equations equal to the number of
relevant paths plus the number of relevant tolls, in the same amount of unknowns (the Op’s and
fj’s). A general algorithm for finding a second-best equilibrium would be:
1.  compute, for a given network equilibrium with given use levels, consistent with given
second-best tolls (possibly 0 in the first iteration), the solution to the system (8)-(9);
2.  implement the implied tolls fj in the network to find a new network equilibrium.
Steps 1 and 2 can then be repeated until convergence.
3.  A numerical simulation model
3.1.  Description of the network and the non-intervention equilibrium
In this section, the solution to the generalized second-best congestion pricing problem
presented above is tested and explored further using a medium-sized network. The network is
primarily designed to capture the most important types of network spill-overs that may be
relevant in the design of second-best congestion pricing schemes, while limiting the number of
links so that the possible danger of the complexity of the network clouding essential insights is
minimized. However, at the same time, a network configuration is used that can describe some
archetype second-best policies in a reasonably accurate way. The resulting network consists of



















Figure 1. The network used for the simulationsThe Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 7
The network has 3 origin-nodes: A, B and C, and two ‘real’ destinations: W and Y&Z. The
latter denotes the bigger city, which is split into two possible destination-nodes: Y and Z. This
distinction is made to enable consideration of public parking charges, which will only affect
that part of the traffic using public parking space (node Z), as opposed to private parking space
(Y). We thus have 8 OD-pairs: AW, AY, AZ, BW, BY, BZ, CY and CZ.
Links 1-7 are real links; the dotted links 0, 8 and 9 are ‘virtual links’, on which no real
traffic costs are incurred and only possibly a toll is charged. Links 8 and 9 denote the use of a
private versus public parking space, respectively. This is assumed to involve a negligible
amount of travelling; hence the choice for representing this part of the trip by a virtual link.
Note that the representation conveniently assumes that people cannot switch from public to
private parking, or vice versa; a formulation with a virtual link connecting Y and Z could be
used to endogenize the choice of public versus private parking. Link 0, attached to every
possible origin node, represents the possibility of using area licences: a fixed toll for travelling,
independent of the route and length of the trip followed. Finally, two pairs of parallel links are
included in the network: 3&4, and 5&6. Such pairs could either represent the existence of
minor roads parallel to highways, or – as will be the case in the simulations below – could be
used to investigate pay-lanes or free-lanes. For every trip terminating in either Y or Z, there are
therefore two possible routes, and the total number of paths in the network is equal to 14.






















AW AY3 AY4 AZ3 AZ4 BW BY3 BY4 BZ3 BZ4 CY5 CY6 CZ5 CZ6
0 (-,-) **************
1 (2.5,  0.001) *****
2 (2.5,  0.001) **
3 (2.5,  0.002) ** **
4 (2.5,  0.0006667) ** **
5 (2.5,  0.002) **
6 (2.5,  0.0006667) **
7 (2.5,  0.003) **** ********
8 (-,-) ** ** **
9 (-,-) ** ** **
Note: Parameters of (link) cost functions and (OD) demand functions are given in brackets (intercept, slope)
Table 1. Incidence of OD-flows, path-flows and link-flows in the simulation model
The simulation network thus seems to capture the most important types of network
complexities that would be relevant for various forms of second-best pricing. These include in
particular: the existence of parallel connections (3&4 and 5&6); the use of serial links; the fact
that drivers using a certain link may have trips with different lengths and routes, normallyThe Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 8
involving different total marginal external costs (e.g., the users on 7); the fact that not all users
of a network need to terminate their trips in the same city (W versus Y&Z) (which is in fact a
variant of the previous complexity); the fact that some pricing policies may not affect all users
with the same route in terms of real links (users on link 8 versus 9); and the existence of
multiple paths for OD-pairs (all OD-pairs except AW and BW). At the same time, the network
can describe some archetype second-best policies:
1.  area licences, which can be represented with a toll on link 0;
2.  parking charges, which can be represented with a toll on link 9;
3.  pay-lanes, which can be represented with a toll on links 3 and/or 5, provided links 3 and 4
together (and 5 and 6 together) are modelled to represent a highway, with 3 (5)
representing one lane;
4.  ‘free-lanes’ (being the mirror image of pay-lanes, so that instead of only one lane on a
highway being tolled, only one lane remains untolled), which can be represented with a toll
on links 4 and/or 6 under the same modelling assumptions as under 3;
5.  a toll-ring around the big city, implying an equal access fee for all users to destinations Y
or Z, which can be represented with a toll on link 7.
For the simulation model, it is assumed that all demand and cost functions are linear. Under the
assumed parameters (see Table 1), an equilibrium results which is characterized by the
following OD-flows: NAW=865, NAY=901, NAZ=901, NBW=1188, NBY=1285, NBZ=1285,
NCY=1328, and NCZ=1328. For the parallel routes, capacity ratios of 1:3 are assumed, yielding
a 1:3 equilibrium route split. One out of four lanes would thus be the pay-lane or free-lane,
when relevant. From the two origin nodes that have flows to both destination cities, more than
two thirds of the traffic goes to the bigger city Y&Z. For convenience of checking results, the
traffic going to the bigger city is assumed to be equally divided among public and private
parking. Note that every real link has the same free-flow costs of 2.5
2, which with a value of
time of 10 would mean 15 minutes of travelling. Travel costs in the non-intervention
equilibrium are around one-and-a-half to two times as high, with values of c1=5.17, c2=4.55,
c3=c4=4.69, c5=c6=3.83 and c7=4.71. Demand elasticities in the non-intervention equilibrium
are in the order of -0.3 to -0.35.
3.2.  The welfare effects of some archetype second-best policies
Solving the set of equations defined by (8)-(9), and using the algorithm described just below
(9), the optimal second-best tolls can be derived for any possible combination of links that can
be tolled (the speed of convergence will be discussed in Section 3.3 below). Table 2 shows for
9 archetype tolling policies the main results: use levels relative to the use in the non-
intervention equilibrium at the link- and OD-level, toll levels, and an efficiency index Z.
Before discussing the qualitative properties of these equilibria, it can be noted that the
simulation model gives an opportunity to test the validity of the optimal tax rules that can be
                                               
2 The model is calibrated to produce monetary values in Dutch Guilders (DFl). The exchange rate of the Dutch
guilder in mid 2000 was approximately DFl 2.2|￿￿|$0.98.The Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 9
derived from the system of equations (8)-(9) (see Verhoef, 2000), in a network that seems to
capture the most important types of network complexities. A simple test was performed,
involving small variations of each second-best toll level generated (keeping other tolls at the
second-best optimal level, when relevant). The resulting welfare level was in all cases found to
be below the level obtained in the relevant second-best optimum. This validates the optimality
of the second-best taxes.
As an illustration, Figure 2 shows the welfare gain relative to the gain obtained in the
second-best optimum with two free-lanes, for tolls varying from 0% to 200% of the second-
best optimal levels. The centre of the diagram, with both tolls set optimally, is indeed the
second-best welfare optimum. The figure further demonstrates that the objective function is
strictly concave with respect to both tolls, and, as a result, relatively flat near the second-best
optimum. This suggests that small errors in toll prediction are relatively unimportant; that is, a
1% further deviation has a greater negative impact on efficiency, the further the toll is from its
second-best optimal value. Similar results were found for all other schemes considered.
3
Figure 2. Relative welfare with varying tolls for the ‘Two free-lanes’ scheme
Despite the artificial character of the simulation model, some of the qualitative properties of
the equilibria are worthy of some further elaboration, in particular because the specific second-
best distortions arising with each of the archetype policies are typical for these policies, and are
likely to occur also in more realistic networks. A meaningful assessment can be given by
comparing the results of a second-best scheme to two bench-marks: the non-intervention
equilibrium and the first-best optimum (which involves reductions in usage with 10-13% for all
links and all OD-pairs; see Table 2). The relative performance of the various second-best
                                               
3 The nearly perfect symmetry displayed in the figure is caused by the linearity of demand and cost functions,
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schemes is represented with an efficiency index Z, which gives the welfare gain relative to the

















all 3,5 4,6 3,4,5,6 3,4 5,6 7 0 9
nAW 0.881 1.000 1.001 1.005 1.005 1.000 1.005 0.903 1.002
nAY 0.871 0.999 0.991 0.907 0.905 1.002 0.920 0.931 1.008
nAZ 0.871 0.999 0.991 0.907 0.905 1.002 0.920 0.931 0.913
nBW 0.896 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.797 1.000
nBY 0.874 0.998 0.985 0.846 0.844 1.003 0.868 0.882 1.009
nBZ 0.874 0.998 0.985 0.846 0.844 1.003 0.868 0.882 0.859
nCY 0.899 0.999 0.993 0.899 1.006 0.894 0.869 0.884 1.008
nCZ 0.899 0.999 0.993 0.899 1.006 0.894 0.869 0.884 0.863
n0 0.884 0.999 0.992 0.909 0.939 0.970 0.909 0.883 0.955
n1 0.874 0.999 0.994 0.939 0.938 1.001 0.947 0.922 0.974
n2 0.890 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.002 1.000 1.002 0.842 1.001
n3 0.873 0.927 1.185 0.871 0.869 1.002 0.889 0.902 0.945
n4 0.873 1.022 0.922 0.871 0.869 1.002 0.889 0.902 0.945
n5 0.899 0.943 1.151 0.899 1.006 0.894 0.869 0.884 0.935
n6 0.899 1.018 0.941 0.899 1.006 0.894 0.869 0.884 0.935
n7 0.883 0.999 0.990 0.882 0.921 0.962 0.882 0.895 0.941
n8 0.883 0.999 0.990 0.882 0.921 0.962 0.882 0.895 1.008




f3 1.908 0.209 4.477 4.462
f4 1.908 0.574 4.477 4.462
f5 1.194 0.099 3.054 3.025




Z 1 0.009 0.072 0.806 0.607 0.195 0.780 0.882 0.387
Z
elas2 1 0.017 0.127 0.802 0.596 0.194 0.778 0.881 0.379
Notes: n is defined as use-level relative to use in the non-intervention equilibrium
Z is the ‘index of relative welfare improvement’: the welfare gain relative to the gain that is achieved
with first-best pricing
Z
elas2 is Z for the parametrization yielding the same non-intervention use levels at double demand
elasticities for each OD-pair
Table 2. Characteristics of second-best optima for some archetype policies
By far the least efficient pricing variant considered turns out to be the imposition of two pay-
lanes on the highways leading to the big city. Consistent with earlier findings (e.g. Verhoef and
Small, 1999), relatively low second-best optimal tolls are found, yielding in the present case an
efficiency improvement of less than one percent of the theoretically possible gains. Verhoef and
Small (1999) have demonstrated that this is probably an underestimate, due to the neglect ofThe Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 11
differences in values of time in the present model, but even when the said underestimation
would amount to a factor 9, as in the numerical model used by Verhoef and Small (1999), pay-
lanes would still only yield a meagre less than 9% efficiency gain. The mirror-image of pay-
lanes, a system of ‘free-lanes’ where only one lane of the highway remains untolled, performs
markedly better with an Z of 0.07, but is still by far only the one-but-least-efficient tolling
scheme.  The reason that these policies are so inefficient is that they cause serious spill-overs to
unpriced parallel routes: the policy variant where tolls apply on the full capacity of the
highway(s) perform much better (‘Two highways’, ‘Highway 34’ and ‘Highway 56’). Under
the assumed conditions, the benefits of simultaneous pricing of parallel links of a highway are
thus highly ‘super-additive’ (the benefits of joint implementation exceed the sum of the benefits
of implementation in isolation), because the said distortionary spill-overs are avoided with
pricing of the full capacity.
The fact that the efficiency gains for ‘Highway 34’ and ‘Highway 56’ are nearly
additive is indicative for the limited degree of interaction between users of these highways:
only on link 7. This interaction is reflected in the second-best toll levels, which are slightly
lower when only the highway alone is tolled (4.46 and 3.02 for Highway 34 and 56,
respectively), compared to the tolls applying when both are subject to tolling (4.48 and 3.05).
This toll reduction reflects that a reduction of usage of one highway will, through reduced
congestion on link 7, induce some extra traffic and hence extra congestion on the other
highway.
4
A specific variant of highway tolling is the toll-ring, which can be seen as highway
pricing where the tolls for users of both highways are restricted to be equal. As a result, the toll
differentiation of 4.48 on Highway 34 versus 3.05 on Highway 56 in ‘Two Highways’ is no
longer possible, and an intermediate second-best optimal toll of 3.89 results. Under the
assumed parameters, the resulting welfare loss is only limited: Z only reduces from 0.802 for
‘Two highways’ to 0.778 for ‘Toll-ring’.
Closely related to ‘Toll-ring’, in fact, is ‘Parking charges’: a toll on link 9, carrying
exactly half of the original users of link 7 in the no-toll equilibrium. Leading to the same type
of second-best distortions as just described for single highways – tolling of users of the virtual
link 9 induces extra use by users of the virtual link 8 through reduced congestion elsewhere in
the network – this policy leads to a second-best toll and a welfare gain less (albeit slightly) than
half that of ‘Toll-ring’: f=3.86 and Z=0.379.
Finally, the policy of ‘Area licences’, implying a non-differentiated toll of 3.46 for all
users, turns out to be the most efficient second-best variant for the assumed network and
parameters. Apparently, the inability to differentiate tolls among users is under the
                                               
4 Note that when two parallel links are priced simultaneously, identical optimal tolls are invariably found. This
is not the result of an exogenous constraint on these tolls, but results from the fact that with linear cost
functions with equal intercepts, and with a single value of time, equalization of marginal costs (a property of
optimality) means that also average costs are equalized. This, in turn, implies equal tolls (which are equal to
the difference between marginal and average cost). When heterogeneity with respect to value of time were
introduced, however, toll differentiation would become beneficial for efficiency (Verhoef and Small, 1999).The Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 12
circumstances considered less detrimental to overall efficiency than network spill-overs that
arise with the other types of second-best pricing considered, despite the considerable variation
in total tolls that can be found for different paths in the first-best optimum (varying from 1.83
for users for OD-pair BW to 6.10 for users for OD-pairs AY and AZ).
The relative performance of the various schemes is of course crucially dependent on the
assumed network configuration (e.g. in terms of availability of parallel routes, implied
interactions, and relative lengths of links and paths) and parameters (e.g. implied capacities,
relative use levels, cost- and demand elasticities). Under the assumed conditions, interactions
between users from different OD-pairs do not seem too important a source of second-best
distortions, which is exemplified by the performance of ‘Highway 34’ or ‘Highway 56’ relative
to ‘Two highways’, and ‘Parking charges’ relative to ‘Toll ring’. On the other hand, distortions
resulting from non-optimally parallel links seem a rather important source of second-best
distortions; witness the relative performance of ‘Two pay-lanes’ and ‘Two free-lanes’
compared to that of ‘Two highways’. Both features could be the result of a relatively inelastic
demand. In the first case, reduction of usage for one OD-pair would then invoke not too much
use from other OD-pairs. In the second case, pricing on one parallel link will most importantly
lead to extra use of the other link, rather than to a reduction in overall use (see also, in Table 2,
the rows reflecting relative use levels).
It is therefore worthwhile to see to what extent the results change when the non-
intervention demand elasticities are doubled, by simultaneously changing the slopes and
intercepts of the demand functions, keeping all other parameters and equilibrium use levels
constant. The first-best equilibrium in this case involves reductions in use between 16 and 21%
of the no-toll use levels, for each OD-pair and for each link. The bottom row in Table 2 shows
the  Z’s under those revised demand elasticities. It turns out that the effect is relatively
strongest for the parallel link charges, with an increase of the relevant Z’s to a level of around
a factor two of the original level – implying, however, still rather low levels of relative
efficiency gains. For the other schemes, the effects are minimal.
The results thus seem reasonably robust for changes in demand elasticities, and seem to
be driven primarily by the assumed network configuration, the base-case use levels and the
base-case congestion levels. Insofar as these would be considered representative for an existing
network, the Z’s presented may provide a reasonably accurate impression of the relative
performance of the second-best tolling schemes considered. In particular, it can be noted that
the two sets of demand elasticities considered define a range (from –0.3 to –0.6) that is
generally considered representative for morning peak road usage.
It might be hypothesized that the assumption of linear cost functions would
systematically discriminate against the parallel link tolling schemes considered. Linear
congestion functions may underestimate the welfare gains from the first marginal reductions in
road usage, if the cost functions are actually steeper near the non-intervention use levels than is
assumed with linear cost functions. However, at the same time, this would imply that the
additional costs from adverse route switching due to parallel link pricing would also be
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would really strongly discriminate against these schemes, in particular when bearing in mind
the limited efficiency gains from such policies that are predicted in other models, using other
types of cost functions (e.g. Verhoef and Small, 1999). As indicated earlier, a stronger source
of underestimation of the benefits of parallel route pricing probably results from the assumed
homogeneity of users with respect to the value of time.
In conclusion, this section has shown that the second-best tax rules implied by the set
of equations (8)-(9) indeed lead to a second-best optimum. The qualitative properties of the
second-best equilibria described here capture the most important sources of distortions
associated with each of the archetype policies considered. The quantitative properties,
summarized in the efficiency index Z, are of course valid only for the assumed network and
parameters.
3.3.  Convergence
From a modelling perspective, an important question concerns the speed of convergence of the
algorithm described just below (9). Whereas the small network considered here easily allows
1000 iterations or more within the time span of one minute on a modern PC, things become
different when the second-best taxes are to be calculated for a large empirical network model.
It will then often be important to restrict the number of iterations needed to find that network
equilibrium for which the second-best tolls (and Lagrangian multipliers) satisfy equations (8)
and (9).
Iteration Pay-lane 3 Pay-lane 3








  f7                 f9
00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.4148 0.2074
* 4.9590 4.0860 3.8840 13.8576 4.3798 0.0000
*
2 0.0077 0.2093 4.4071 3.8474
* 3.4071 12.0033 3.8317 ..





4 0.0151 .. 4.4617 3.8605 3.4585 12.2200 3.8917 ..
5 0.3999 .. 4.4625 3.8606 3.4593 12.2246 3.8927 ..
6 0.0223 .. 4.4624 .. 3.4592 12.2240 3.8926 ..
7 0.3929 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
8 0.0292 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
9 0.3862 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
10 0.0358 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Note:  The underlined value marks the iteration for which the toll has reached its equilibrium value in whole
cents. A column ends when the toll does no longer change at 4 digit precision.
*Iteration for which the toll is within ± 1% of equilibrium value.
#Alternative in which after each iteration, instead of using the newly predicted toll level, the average of this
newly predicted toll level and the previous toll level is used to calculate the next network equilibrium.
Table 3. Convergence of the general algorithm
Table 3 shows the sequences of tolls in subsequent iterations that were found for a number of
tolling schemes, partly overlapping with those in Table 2, starting with initial tolls equal to
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tolls in case of first-best pricing) has approached the second-best equilibrium value within an
accuracy limit of ± 1%. For all but one policies (Pay-lane 3, see below), this is the case after
three iterations or less. Usually, one iteration later the toll has reached its equilibrium value in
whole cents – a very practical measure of accuracy, which however of course strongly depends
on local circumstances, among which the currency used. Interestingly, even for a policy with
two serial links (7 and 9), the algorithm converges very rapidly, even though such a policy may
seem prone to inefficiently slow convergence due to the possible danger of alternating higher
and lower toll levels for the two serial links.
Table 3 thus shows that the use of the system of equations (8)-(9) and the simple
algorithm described just below (9) provide a rather efficient way of finding second-best optimal
tolls in most cases, that probably cannot easily be improved upon – unless, of course, the
mathematical software used could cope with the original set of (possibly partly non-linear)
equations (5)-(7), implying that a second-best equilibrium could be found in one calculation.
The intuition behind this efficiency is that in each iteration, all relevant information affecting
the second-best level of a toll, insofar as available in the computed equilibrium, is used as
efficiently as possible to predict new toll levels. This, for instance, secures that f9 is kept at a
level equal to zero in the serial links example. As demonstrated by ‘Highway 34’, ‘First-best’
and ‘Serial Links 79’, this picture does not change when multiple instead of single tolls are
used. Important qualifications, however, are that convergence is likely to require more
iterations when the network becomes larger (although the impact of a given toll decreases with
the distance from the tolled link) and, in particular, when demand and cost functions are non-
linear. In particular, in each iteration, the predicted tolls are based on the local slopes of
demand and cost functions (compare (8)-(9)). The error in the prediction may be expected to
increase when these slopes are not constant.
As stated, an exception to the rather efficient performance is given by the pay-lane
policy, for which the ± 1% accuracy limit would only be reached after no less than some 250
iterations, during which the predicted toll consistently alternately overshoots and undershoots
the second-best equilibrium level. Apart from being a particularly inefficient policy, pay-lanes
thus also make the general algorithm particularly inefficient (comparable patterns were found
for the other pay-lane and for free-lanes). The inefficiency of the algorithm can be repaired by
using a minor variation on the general algorithm, in which after each iteration instead of using
the newly predicted toll level, the average of this newly predicted toll level and the previous
toll level is used to calculate the next network equilibrium. As shown in the second column, the
toll is then predicted within a ± 1% accuracy range already after the first iteration. This
procedure – or yet another variation thereof – is likely to be useful for larger networks, too.
Fortunately, links exhibiting this type of behaviour can be identified after 2 iterations already,
because of the low value of the second predicted toll relative to the first prediction.
4.  The optimal selection of toll-points
In the practical design of second-best tolling schemes, a question probably equally important to
that of finding the second-best optimal tolls for a given set of toll-points, involves the questionThe Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 15
of which links to toll in the first place. Especially in larger networks, this may not be easy to
decide on the basis of logical reasoning, if anything due to the large number of possibilities,
5
and to the complicated interactions that may exist between tolls on different links. It is
therefore interesting to consider the question of whether on the basis of the information
available in the existing equilibrium, it is possible to predict which link(s) would be the ‘best’
one(s) to select for the implementation of tolling points. ‘Best’, in this analysis, refers to the
highest positive impact on social surplus; obviously, political, social or practical considerations
may sometimes lead to the selection of different toll-points.
It should be emphasized that this analysis is relevant only for situations where it is
impracticable to follow the obviously most reliable route of selecting optimal toll points,
namely the calculation of the second-best optima for each possible combination of t tolls in a J-
link network, and comparing the welfare levels to select the optimal combination.
This section deals with this problem of selecting the optimal t toll-points in a J-link
network. The question of optimizing t itself is left aside; this problem could be formalized in a
straightforward manner by considering the marginal cost for implementing an additional toll-
point. Section 4.1 starts with the selection of a single first toll-point, and Section 4.2 proceeds
with the selection of multiple toll-points.
4.1.  The optimal first toll-point
Verhoef (2000) discussed possible indicators for the selection of a first toll-point in a network,
which can be calculated on the basis of ‘out-of-equilibrium’ values of Op and fj, as they can be
approximated in the initial no-toll equilibrium. One of the hypotheses was that in practice, the
product of two indicators, to be discussed below, may in fact perform best. In this section, this
particular hypothesis will be considered further, and will be tested in the numerical network
presented in the previous section. As will become clear below, the great advantage in a
computational sense of the proposed procedure is that, instead of having to calculate J second-
best network equilibria, only 1+J systems of linear equations will have to be solved.
The proposed indicator Ix predicts the welfare gain from implementing a second-best
toll on link x, starting from the no-toll equilibrium, as half the product of two terms. The first is
Fx, representing the level of the second-best toll fx as it is predicted in the no-toll equilibrium.
The second is Lx, representing the (marginal) impact on social surplus of a marginal increase in
the toll on that link, evaluated in the no-toll equilibrium. Hence, Ix=½￿Fx￿Lx. The intuition
behind the indicator Ix is simple. As Lx, to be defined precisely in equation (9c) below,
represents for each possible toll level the (marginal) gain in social surplus due to marginal
increases in the toll, the total gain in social surplus ’Wx from using the toll optimally at a level
fx can be represented as:
6
                                               














. For 3 tolls on a 100-link
network, this already implies 161700 combinations, and for 50 tolls no less than 1.0￿10
29 combinations.
6 For each possible toll level on link x, the term Lx consists of the sum of Lagrangian multipliers. Such
multipliers in general represent the impact on the objective of a marginal loosening of the constraint, withThe Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 16
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The first-order condition in (9) implies that, evaluated in the second-best optimum, Lx
according to (9c) will be equal to zero; i.e. L x=0 in the upper limit of integration in (10). A
simple linear approximation of ’Wx as defined in (10) would therefore be ½￿Lx￿Fx. If the
relative error of this prediction would be equal for all possible tolls, the indicator Ix would
correlate perfectly with the welfare gains that can be realized using a toll on link x.
Lx can be calculated, for a given network equilibrium, as a variant on the first-order
condition (9). Specifically, for a given initial network equilibrium, first define Lp (for each
relevant path) as the value found after simultaneous solution of the set of equations:
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(where, starting with the no-toll equilibrium, Gj=fj=0 for all j). Note that the number of
equations in the set (8c) is equal to the number of unkowns, Lp (note in particular that all use
levels Np are treated as given). Both are equal to the number of relevant paths in the initial
equilibrium considered. Lp can thus be interpreted as the ‘out-of-equilibrium value’ of the
Lagrangian multiplier Op used in (4). With Lp thus calculated for every relevant path, Lx for link
x can then be found as the following variant on (9):
ƒƒ
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Next, Fx represents the predicted second-best optimal toll level on link x, if that link were the
only link to be tolled in the entire network. Such a prediction can be found from the solution to
the set of equations given by (8)-(9) with (9) included only for the link x considered, starting
with zero tolls. Fx is therefore the same as the prediction of fx in iteration 1 in Table 3.
Note that the possible indicator Lx alone, when calculated for the non-intervention
equilibrium, would fail to take account of the specific distortions resulting from second-best
tolls on a specific link, as the condition defining the optimal use of a specific second-best toll,
(9), has not been used. Similarly, the possible indicator Fx alone only reflects the predicted toll
level, without taking into account the predicted welfare gain that may be realized with it.
Finally, as an aside, note that Lx can only be derived from (8c), and not from the Op’s found in
the first-iteration solution of (8)-(9), as in the latter case equation (9) would imply a zero value
of Lx.
                                                                                                                                                  
optimal adjustments in all other choice variables (in this case: the levels of use N). A marginal loosening of the
constraint can in this case be interpreted as a marginal increases in the relevant toll; compare the formulation
of the Lagrangian in (4).The Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 17
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a Correlation coefficient ’Wx and Ix: 0.9987
b I
*
x is Ix calculated using the true second-best toll (hence, I
*
x=Lx￿fx)











e Correlation coefficient ’Wx and I
II
x: 0.9999
Table 4. Performance of the toll-selection indicators Ix and I
II
x
Table 4 shows the performance of the toll-selection indicator Ix for each of the links in the
network presented in Section 3. The Z’s shown in the first row indicate that the efficiency
gains vary considerably between the 10 possibilities, with Z varying from 0.002 for link 5 to
0.882 for link 0, so that the indicator can be tested for a wide variety of types of links and
efficiency levels. Ix perfectly predicts the ranking of the 10 links. However, the relative size of
the welfare gains is predicted less accurately, with a correlation coefficient of 0.9987.
Problems are caused, again, by the two sets of parallel links 3&4, and 5&6. The third
row of Table 4 shows that, whereas links 0, 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9 exhibit a rather constant ratio
between ’Wx and Ix (between 0.89 and 0.95), the parallel links 3-6 have a distinctly lower (but
again constant) ratio of 0.52-0.54. This is consistent with the findings in Table 3, which shows
that Fx – the prediction of fx in the first iteration – is much further above the true second-best
optimal value of the toll for the parallel link 3 than for other links (similar patterns were found
for links 4-6, not shown in Table 3). As a result, Ix would be overestimated, and ’Wx/Ix
underestimated, for links 3-6 (relative to the estimates for other links) in Table 4. This
explanation is supported by the values of ’Wx/I
*
x shown in the fourth row of Table 4, where I
*
x
is Ix calculated using the true second-best toll (hence, I
*
x=Lx￿fx), instead of using its first-
iteration projected value Fx. I
*
x shows a much smaller variation than Ix, and is close to 1 for all
links. As a result, the correlation coefficient between ’Wx and I
*
x is 1.0000 (and the ranking is
predicted perfectly). As an aside, note that the values of ’Wx/I
*
x near 1 support the intuition
given earlier for the indicator Ix.
On the basis of the small network used here, Ix therefore appears a relatively accurate
indicator for the selection of a first toll point in a network. It predicts the ranking of links
perfectly, and the relative welfare gains reasonably well. There is however a consistent
overestimation of the predicted welfare gains for links having parallel connections. The
indicator nevertheless takes on relatively low values for such links, so that the chances of
accidentally selecting such a link are not too large. Nevertheless, this implies that in larger
networks, the ranking of such links is likely to be consistently upwardly biased (that is, the
predicted ranking will be closer to 1 than the actual ranking).The Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 18
It should be re-emphasized that Ix can be calculated after the solution of only 1+J
systems of linear equations: system (8c) once, and system (8)-(9) for each j, and requires the
calculation of no network equilibria other than the initial no-toll equilibrium. The use of this
indicator will therefore be attractive only if this procedure requires considerably less time than
finding the optimal toll for each of the J links, which involves the calculation of a multiple of J
of network equilibria, and an equal amount of solutions of systems of linear equations (8)-(9)
to calculate new toll levels for each iteration – the multiplicative factor in ‘the multiple of J’
depending on the speed of convergence of the general algorithm for the particular network.
Especially for larger networks, a relevant question therefore is whether a pragmatic
compromise between these two strategies can be found, which further improves the
performance of the indicator Ix as shown in Table 4, without requiring the calculation of a
multiple of J network equilibria. As the fourth row in Table 4 suggests, it would in particular
be beneficial to have better estimates of fx than the first-iteration predictor Fx.
One possibility would be to perform, for each link, the general algorithm for finding the
second-best optimal toll described under equation (9) for ‘one-and-a-half iteration’, and to use
in the calculation of Ix, instead of Fx, the average of Fx
1 (Fx as found in the first iteration,
starting from the initial equilibrium), and the value Fx
2 found by solution of (8)-(9) starting
from the equilibrium with a toll fx=Fx
1. This implies a revised indicator I
II





2). The bottom row in Table 4 shows the results of using this
revised indicator I
II
x. It performs markedly better than Ix, bringing the ratio ’Wx/I
II
x for the
pairs of parallel links 3&4 and 5&6 much more in line with those for the other links. As a
result, the correlation coefficient between ’Wx and I
II
x has gone up to 0.9999 (and the ranking
is again predicted perfectly). A side-advantage of using the revised indicator I
II
x would be that
it immediately allows the identification of links suffering from slowly converging second-best
tolls, which will have a small ratio Fx
2/Fx
1. This is useful information, as it both may help
designing an efficient algorithm for finding second-best optima (as explained in Section 3), and
as it is useful information for procedures for selecting sets of links to be tolled, as will become
clear in Section 4.2 below.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the indicators Ix and I
II
x both use linear predictions
from the no-toll equilibrium. The linearity of cost and demand functions used in the simulation
model may therefore lead to an overestimation of the accuracy of the indicator.
4.2.  The selection of multiple toll-points
When, instead of a single toll, the optimal locations for a set of t>1 tolls have to be determined,
the size of the problem increases rapidly, due to the sheer number of combinations that can be
chosen from. The question is whether accurate procedures can be developed to identify the t
links in a J-link network for which the implementation of t second-best tolls would lead to the
highest possible efficiency gain, without having to go through the possibly enormous task of
calculating J!/(t!￿(J–t)!) second-best optima. On the basis of the discussion in the previous sub-
section, three possible strategies can be identified, which will be discussed in order of
increasing computational burden.The Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 19
link 0 link 1 link 2 link 3 link 4 link 5 link 6 link 7 link 8 link 9
link 0 0.88
link 1 0.95 0.43
link 2 0.91 0.46 0.13
link 3 0.88 0.44 0.14 0.01
link 4 0.89 0.46 0.19 0.61 0.06
link 5 0.88 0.44 0.14 0.01 0.06 0.00
link 6 0.88 0.45 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.01
link 7 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
link 8 0.89 0.67 0.52 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.78 0.39
link 9 0.89 0.67 0.52 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.78 0.78 0.39
Note: The terms in diagonal cells denote relative efficiency with single-link tolling on the associated link
Table 5. Performance of the possible combinations of two toll-points (Z)
The analysis and discussion will be restricted to the situation where only two toll-points
(denoted x and y) can be implemented on the network used in this paper. This allows
consideration of the most important issues, while keeping the presentation manageable in the
sense that only ½￿10￿9=45 possible combinations have to be considered. Moreover, with two
toll-points, already 95% of the possible efficiency gains are achieved in the network used.
Table 5 shows the relative performance for each of these combinations, expressed in the
efficiency indicator Z, with the Z’s in the 10 diagonal cells representing the performance of the
relevant toll used in isolation, as a single toll. As the addition of an extra toll point can never
lead to a reduction in social welfare – the extra toll can always be kept at a zero level, which
for instance is optimal when adding a toll-point on link 8 or 9 to a second-best toll on link 7 –
each diagonal cell has the minimum score for the associated row and column.
The five most favourable combinations are, in order of decreasing efficiency: (0,1),
(1,7), and, ex equo, (0,2), (0,7) and (2,7). Inspection of the network reveals that the latter
three possibilities should indeed be equivalent, each allowing differentiated tolls for the two
main destinations W and Y&Z. The four least efficient combinations, not surprisingly, involve
the four possible combinations of parallel links 3-6 for which the parallel-link problem is not
avoided: (3,5), (3,6), (4,5) and (4,6). Whereas the most efficient combination already achieves
95% of the maximum possible welfare gains, the relative efficiency for these latter options does
not exceed 8%. With the combinations considered, there thus seems to be sufficient
differentiation in efficiency to test the performance of the three strategies for selecting the
optimal combination.
4.2.1.  Strategy 1: selecting the t toll-points with the highest score Ix for implementation in
isolation
The simplest possible strategy for selecting the t>1 best performing toll-points would be to
choose those t links that have the highest predicted scores Ix (or I
II
x, when available) for the
implementation as a single toll-point. The simplicity of this procedure stems from the fact that
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to ‘sub-additivity’ or ‘super-additivity’ of the benefits of implementing an extra toll-point. Sub-
additivity (the benefits of joint implementation are smaller than the sum of the benefits of
implementation in isolation) is likely to occur with tolls on serial links; compare for instance
links 7 and 8 in Table 5. Super-additivity (the benefits of joint implementation exceed the sum
of the benefits of implementation in isolation) may for instance result with tolls implemented on
parallel links; compare for instance links 3 and 4 in Table 5.
This means that this strategy could only be reliable when the interaction between tolls is
small. This could for instance be the case when the number of toll-points t is small relative to
the number of links J, when the links with the highest scores Ix or I
II
x are sufficiently far apart
to prevent strong interactions, and when these links do not suffer from reduced efficiency due
to the existence of parallel routes so that biased scores Ix are unlikely to occur. Based on the
indicator Ix (as opposed to I
II
x), the indicator Ixy
s1=Ix+Iy (where s1 denotes ‘strategy 1’) would
then predict the welfare gains of using toll-points x and y together.
The network considered in this paper is too small, and hence the interactions are too
strong, to make this strategy appear very reliable. Using the indicator Ixy
s1, the following
combinations are predicted as the most efficient ones (in order of decreasing predicted
efficiency Ixy
s1): (0,7), (0,1), (0,8) and (0,9), and (1,7). The truly third option is ranked first,
and the truly first option is ranked second. The correlation coefficient between predicted and
true efficiency for all possible combinations of two toll-points is 0.9152, which is probably not
high enough to make this indicator seem sufficiently reliable. The obvious advantage of this
procedure, however, is that no additional calculations are needed, compared to those necessary
for the selection of an optimal first toll-point. There are thus two reasons why this strategy
may become relatively more attractive for larger networks: the implied savings in the amount
of additional calculations (compared to strategies 2 and 3 below) become more significant, and
the degree of interactions between tolls probably becomes less important, as a network
becomes bigger.
4.2.2.  Strategy 2: selecting toll-points one-by-one, taking previously selected tolls as given
A second possible strategy involves a step-by-step approach, in which the optimal next toll-
point is selected given the selection of the previous toll-point(s), and given the second-best
optimal toll level(s) applying in the second-best equilibrium with these previous toll(s) set
optimally. After the determination of the second-best network equilibrium given the previous
toll(s), this requires the same procedure and hence the same amount of calculations (minus the
number of links already tolled) as the procedure for selecting the first toll-point, discussed in
Section 4.1. Interactions between the existing toll(s) and the new toll are taken into account in
a one-directional way: the (predicted) tolls for possible next toll-points are optimally adjusted
to the existence and level(s) of the previous toll(s), which themselves are treated as given.
As a consequence, the score for a given combination of t tolls will generally depend on
the order in which the tolls are assumed to be implemented; in particular, on the question of
which one was the last toll-point added. For the assessment of the performance of this
indicator in the simulation model, for each combination (x,y) the indicator Ixy
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for the sequence where first a toll is implemented on the link l for which Il is higher. This
mimics the order in which tolls would be selected in practice, using this indicator. Labelling the
link with the first chosen toll x and the other link y, the indicator Ixy
s2 is then defined as
Ixy
s2=’Wx+Iyx, where Iyx denotes the predicted welfare gain from implementing a second-best
optimal toll on link y, keeping the toll fx fixed at its previous second-best optimal level. The
indicator thus defined correctly predicts (0,1) as the optimal combination of 2 toll-points for
the network considered here, followed by (1,7) and (2,7). The combinations (0,2) and (0,7) are
ranked fourth and fifth, whereas they in reality should share the third rank with (2.7). The
correlation coefficient between predicted and true efficiency is 0.9798, which is considerably
higher than for strategy 1.
This second strategy thus adds tolls one by one, by predicting the best next toll-point
given the true second-best optimum when using the toll-points already selected. A possible
drawback of this method would be that toll-points that seems relatively efficient in the
beginning of this procedure may in fact become less attractive when the total number of toll-
points t increases. Checks could be built in the procedure to account for this possibility. For
instance, when the target number of tolls t is reached, a possible test would involve the
removal of previously selected toll-points to see whether these links are still predicted as the
most efficient option. Another drawback is that for the selection of t tolls, t-1 second-best
network equilibria have to be calculated. A third drawback, already mentioned, involves the
fact that interactions between tolls are only taken into account in a one-directional manner
when predicting the next toll-point. This issue is dealt with more explicitly in the third possible
strategy for selecting multiple toll-points.
4.2.3.  Strategy 3: selecting the set of toll-points with the highest predicted score when
implemented simultaneously
The third strategy is designed to fully account for interactions between tolls. This strategy
would calculate for each possible combination of t possible toll-points in a J-link network the
predicted efficiency gain from simultaneous implementation. This can be done by including (9)
for each of the t links in the specific combination considered when solving (8)-(9) to find Fx
and Fy. This results in predictions for tolls for the links considered that fully take account of
interactions between the tolls. The predicted tolls can then be multiplied with Lx and Ly as
resulting from the solution of (8c)-(9c). The resulting indicator Ixy
s3=Fx￿Lx+Fy￿Ly is a
straightforward generalization of Ix introduced in Section 4.1, and will therefore henceforth
simply be denoted Ixy.
Among the three strategies considered, this one appears to perform best, with the first
five combinations ranked perfectly, and a correlation coefficient of predicted and true welfare
gains of 0.9987 – coincidentally the same value that was found for Ix applied to single links.
Table 6 shows the performance of this indicator in terms of ’Wxy/Ixy. While for most
combinations, this ratio is rather constant in the range 0.88-0.94, deviations are found again for
combinations involving parallel links. Fortunately, however, by far not all combinations
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mentioned. In contrast, four out of the in total only five ‘strongly deviating ratios’, marked in
bold in Table 6, involve paired combinations of one link of Highway 34 and one of Highway
56. Despite the upward biased predictions of efficiency gains of using these combinations,
these five problematic combinations are ranked 37, 42, 43, 44 and 45 (out of 45) by the
indicator Ixy, which makes the erroneous selection of such combinations highly unlikely.
Moreover, when links suffering from close parallel substitutes are already identified earlier, as
suggested in Section 4.1, an extra safety check could easily be built into the procedure to
identify less reliable predictions.
link 0 link 1 link 2 link 3 link 4 link 5 link 6 link 7 link 8
link 1 0.88
link 2 0.89 0.91
link 3 0.89 0.91 0.87
link 4 0.89 0.88 0.75 0.90
link 5 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.52 0.54
link 6 0.89 0.90 0.85 0.53 0.54 0.93
link 7 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
link 8 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.89
link 9 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.89
Notes: Correlation coefficient ’Wxy and Ixy: 0.9987
Bold figures represent ratios outside the range 0.88-0.94
Table 6. Performance of the toll-selection indicator Ixy: ’Wxy/Ixy
With these considerations kept in mind, the indicator Ixy appears a sufficiently reliable indicator
for the selection of multiple toll-points – at least based on the results obtained with the present
network. Among the three possible strategies considered, this third strategy seems the one
preferable on theoretical grounds – in particular the fact that interactions between tolls are
taking into account – as well as the one performing best in terms of the correlation between
predicted and true efficiency gains of the various combinations of toll-points considered. The
main disadvantage is the large number of calculations that will have to be performed:
1+J!/(t!￿(J–t)!) solutions to systems of linear equations; the 1 representing (8c)-(9c), and the
J!/(t!￿(J–t)!) representing (8)-(9) (with (9) included for each of the t links belonging to the
specific combination considered). However, an advantage compared to strategy 2 is that no
network equilibria have to be calculated to determine the set of suggested toll-points.
4.3.  The selection of toll-points: concluding comments
The indicator Ix proposed in Section 4.1 for the selection of a first single toll point appears a
reasonably accurate measure, with a correlation coefficient between true and predicted welfare
gains of 0.9987. Whether it would be worthwhile to use the computationally more demanding
indicator I
*
x instead is a question that is difficult to answer in general, as it will depend on the
network used. A pragmatic compromise would be to calculate Ix for all links, and I
*
x for a
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I
*
x for all links has the advantage that links suffering from slow convergence and overestimated
welfare gains from tolling due to the presence of parallel links can immediately be identified.
For the determination of multiple toll-points, comparable pragmatic solutions may be
used in practice. Three strategies were identified, where the computational burden seems to be
increasing with the quality of the prediction (although for some models, strategy 2 may actually
turn out to be more demanding than strategy 3). An obvious possibility is to limit the set of
possible combinations of t toll-points in a J-link network on the basis of strategy 1, and to use
strategy 3 for this reduced set of combinations. Alternatively, one could start with the set of t
links suggested by strategy 1, calculate the second-best equilibrium for this combination, and
monitor the extent to which implied second-best taxes deviate from the predictions consistent
with strategy 1. Second-best taxes markedly lower than these predictions would reflect a likely
overestimation of the predicted welfare gains with strategy 1. One could then either look for
sets of toll-points skipping these links, or could identify the relevant unpriced parallel links
causing the deviation, and apply extra tolls on these links – possibly in exchange for those toll-
points that had the lowest scores in strategy 1 if the number of t toll-points is a hard constraint.
The conclusion is therefore that, provided used with care, the toll-selection procedures
discussed may be helpful in identifying those links for which the implementation of toll-points
may lead to relatively large efficiency gains. The computational advantage realized by avoiding
the calculation of J!/(t!￿(J–t)!) second-best network equilibria comes at the price of a below
unity correlation coefficient between predicted and true welfare gains. However, the results are
encouraging enough to justify further testing or even application of these indicators – and the
pragmatic compromises mentioned just above – in large network models.
5.  Conclusion
This paper considered the generalized second-best network congestion pricing problem, in
which not all links of a network can be tolled, so that the standard first-best solution of tolls
equal to marginal external costs for all links is not a relevant policy option. A simulation model
was used, designed to capture the most important types of possible network complications
while allowing for a meaningful consideration of some archetype second-best policies that are
often used or proposed for real road transport networks. Using this model, the general solution
proposed by Verhoef (2000) was validated, in the sense that this solution was indeed found to
produce second-best optimal tolls for the second-best policies considered. The simulation
model confirmed earlier findings that parallel route pricing schemes – in particular ‘pay-lanes’
– constitute a relatively inefficient type of second-best congestion pricing. ‘Free-lanes’,
although still not very efficient, at least lead to higher welfare gains than ‘pay-lanes’, and might
therefore often offer an alternative to pay-lanes that is preferable on efficiency grounds.
The paper considered a number of aspects of the general problem and its solution that
would be relevant when studying this type of second-best pricing in larger networks. First of
all, the proposed algorithm for finding a second-best optimum appears relatively efficient, in
the sense that for most tolls after two or three iterations, the optimal second-best toll is
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suffering from the availability of parallel substitutes. However, a simple variation on the
general algorithm was found to behave as efficiently as the general algorithm does for links not
having such substitutes.
In the practical design of second-best tolling schemes, a question probably equally
important to that of finding the second-best optimal tolls for a given set of toll-points, involves
the question of which links to toll in the first place. Especially in larger networks, this may not
be easy to decide on the basis of logical reasoning, if anything due to the large number of
possibilities, and to the complicated interactions that may exist between tolls on different links.
The paper therefore considered the question of whether on the basis of the information
available in the existing equilibrium, it is possible to predict which link(s) would be the most
efficient one(s) to select for the implementation of tolling points. The basic procedure
suggested for one link and the theoretically most correct variation thereof for multiple links
performed rather well, with correlation coefficients of predicted and true welfare gains
exceeding 0.99. For the case of single links, a more accurate indicator was suggested, and for
the case of multiple links, computationally less demanding indicators were put forward.
However, on the basis of the current network, it is hard to make a definite assessment of the
relative performance the different indicators for other types of networks.
This brings us to the directions for further research. Two possibilities seem particularly
worth further explorations. The first one involves the use and further testing of the proposed
methodology and indicators in larger networks, possibly involving non-linear demand and cost-
functions. It would be interesting to see to what extent the generally favourable results
reported here are due to these two features of the network used. One might suspect that in
particular the assumed linearity of the cost and demand functions may lead to an
overestimation of the efficiency of the algorithm and procedures considered. A second topic
for further study would involve the introduction of theoretical refinements in the general
problem set-up and network model used in this paper. These refinements could in particular
involve the introduction of dynamics and the consideration of heterogeneous traffic. The
results presented in this paper seem encouraging enough to justify such further research.
References
Arnott, R., A. de Palma and R. Lindsey (1990) "Economics of a bottleneck" Journal of Urban
Economics 27 11-30.
Braid, R.M. (1989) "Uniform versus peak-load pricing of a bottleneck with elastic demand" Journal of
Urban Economics 26 320-327.
Braid, R.M. (1996) "Peak-load pricing of a transportation route with an unpriced substitute" Journal of
Urban Economics 40 (179-197).
Dafermos, S. (1973) "Toll patterns for multiclass-user transportation networks" Transportation Science
7 211-223.
Dafermos, S. (1980) "Traffic equilibrium and variational inequalities" Transportation Science 14 42-
54.
De Palma, A. and R. Lindsey (1999) "Private roads: competition under various ownership regimes"
Annals of Regional Science forthcoming.The Generalized Second-Best Network Congestion Pricing Problem 25
De Palma, A. and Y. Nesterov (1998) "Optimization formulations and static equilibrium in congested
transportation networks" Paper presented to the 8
th WCTR-conference, 12–17 july 1998,
Antwerp, Belgium.
Glazer, A. and E. Niskanen (1992) "Parking fees and congestion" Regional Science and Urban
Economics 22 123-132.
Kinderlehrer, D. and G. Stampacchia (1980) An Introduction to Variational Inequalities and Their
Applications Academic Press, New York.
Lévy-Lambert, H. (1968) "Tarification des services à qualité variable: application aux péages de
circulation"  Econometrica 36 (3-4) 564-574.
Marchand, M. (1968) "A note on optimal tolls in an imperfect environment" Econometrica 36 (3-4)
575-581.
Nagurney, A. (1993) Network Economics: A Variational Inequality Approach Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht.
Small, K.A. and J.A. Gomez-Ibañez (1998) "Road pricing for congestion management: the transition
from theory to policy". In: K.J. Button and E.T. Verhoef (1998) Road Pricing, Traffic
Congestion and the Environment: Issues of Efficiency and Social Feasibility Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham (forthcoming).
Smith, M.J. (1979) "The marginal cost pricing of a transportation network" Transportation Research
13B 237-242.
Verhoef, E.T. (1999) "Time, speeds, flows and densities in static models of road traffic congestion and
congestion pricing" Regional Science and Urban Economics 29 341-369.
Verhoef, E.T. (2000) "Second-best congestion pricing in general static transportation networks with
elastic demands" Unpublished paper, Free University Amsterdam.
Verhoef, E.T., P. Nijkamp and P. Rietveld (1995) "Second-best regulation of road transport
externalities"  Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 29 (2) 147-167.
Verhoef, E.T., P. Nijkamp and P. Rietveld (1996) "Second-best congestion pricing: the case of an
untolled alternative" Journal of Urban Economics 40 (3) 279-302.
Verhoef, E.T. and K.A. Small (1999) "Product differentiation on roads: second-best congestion pricing
with heterogeneity under public and private ownership" Discussion paper TI 99-066/3,
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam-Rotterdam.
Vickrey, W.S. (1969) "Congestion theory and transport investment" American Economic Review 59
(Papers and Proceedings) 251-260.
Wardrop, J. (1952) "Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research" Proceedings of the Institute of
Civil Engineers 1 (2) 325-378.
Yan, H. and W.H.K. Lam (1996) "Optimal road tolls under conditions of queueing and congestion"
Transportation Research 30A (5) 319-332.